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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Cameron Watts appeals from the district court's order denying his petition for 
post-conviction relief after evidentiary hearing. 
B. Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Appellant relies on his statement of the facts and course of proceedings in his 
opening brief and does not re-state them here. 
Ill. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 




The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Watt's Petition For Post-Conviction 
Relief 
A. Standard of Review and Background. 
Upon review of a district-court's denial of a petition for post-conviction relief when 
an evidentiary hearing has occurred, Idaho appellate courts will not distum the district 
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 
695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 {1999), citing I.R.C.P. 52(a); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 
65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct. App.1990). When reviewing mixed questions of law and 
fact, the appellate court defers to the district court's factual findings supported by 
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substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of the relevant law to those 
facts. /d., citing Young v. State, 115 Idaho 52, 54, 764 P.2d 129, 131 (Ct. App.1988). 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a post-conviction action, 
one must show that his or her attorney's performance was deficient, and that he or she 
was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); 
Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 199f.) To establish 
deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 
760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Suits v. State, 143 Idaho 160, 162, 139 P.3d 762, 
764 (Ct. App. 2006). To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable 
probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial 
would have been different. Id. 
Mr. Watts was charged by indictment with murder for his participation with a Mr. 
John McElhiney in the kidnapping of a man who the state alleged died as a result of that 
kidnapping. (R., p. 156). Mr. Watts wanted to proceed to trial. (R., p. 156). However, 
shortly before trial, Mr. Greg Fuller, counsel for Mr. Watts, was informed that the filing 
other unrelated charges was being contemplated by the state, involving allegations of 
lewd and lascivious conduct, in Twin Falls, Gooding and Jerome counties. (R., p. 156). 
Over the course of the following week, plea agreements were reached in which 
Mr. Watts would plead guilty to the instant murder charge, the contemplated new 
charges would not be pursued, and a recommendation of 20 years fixed would be 
stipulated to by the parties. (R., p. 156). 
? 
As stated above, Mr. Watts contended in his post-conviction claim that he was 
coerced into entering his guilty plea due to his attorney's ineffective assistance of 
counsel and/or that due to ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Watts was deprived of 
' 
the opportunity to move to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing. (R., p. 158). 
Mr. Watt's further contends that his attorney was ineffective such that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not properly 
investigate and inform him regarding the alleged additional charges in Twin Falls, 
Gooding and Jerome counties that because his attorney did not fully advise him prior to 
entry of guilty plea such that his plea was not voluntary; (R,. p. 113-114). This failure 
led to him capitulating to the plea agreement, despite not wanting to do so, 
demonstrating the prejudice caused by such failure. In short, Mr. Watts contends that if 
he had been fully advised, he would not have entered a guilty plea. 
Furthermore, Mr. Watts was deprived of his opportunity to move to withdraw his 
guilty plea in a timely way, because Mr. Fuller failed to discuss it w;i.h him prior to 
receiving and reviewing the PSI, and after having reviewed it, told Mr. Watts that "it 
could notbe done". (R., p. 114-115). 
Hearing was held on these issues on March 22, 2010. 
B. Coercion Claim. 
As stated in appellant's opening brief, "[wJhen a guilty plea is entered upon the 
advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice 
was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Gilpin-
Grubb v._ State, 138 Idaho 76, 82, 57 P.3d 787, 793 (2002, internal quotations and 
citations omitted). Actual prejudice is demonstrated by a showing of a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty. 
Id. 
Mr. Watt's testimony was clear that he was pressured into pleading guilty by the 
actions of his attorney and his staff. (Tr. 3/22/10, p.37, l.3 - p.48, L.19.). Mr. Watts 
testified repeatedly that Mr. Fuller kept telling him he would "do" at least three life terms 
and not be able to see his son, that he had no time to think it over, and further, that he 
could call or talk to no one or all deals would be off. (Tr. 3/22/10, p.41, L.19 - p.42, 
L.1.). 
Such pressure in a relatively short period of time clearly demonstrates the lack of 
true voluntariness in this case. Mr. Watt's clear statement was that if he had been more 
properly informed, and if he had not been pressured, his decision whether or not to 
exercise his constitutional right to a trial by a jury of his peers would have been different. 
In fact, he testified that the very next day after entry of plea, upon receiving time for 
thought while not under pressure, he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea. (Tr. 3/22/10, p. 
48, Lines 9-19.). 
Mr. Fuller's testimony admits the time pressure. He testified, "I realize there was 
not a lot of time, but I believe ... from the time he found out about it to the change of 
plea was the 3rd to the yth, _three or four days, and we worked on it all weekend." (Tr., p. 
116, Ls. 2-6.) 
This testimony from Mr. Watt's attorney confirms Mr. Watt's own testimony. 
Therefore, he contends that the district court's findings of fact regarding the 
voluntariness of his guilty plea were clearly erroneous, and that the court's conclusions 
were in error. 
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C. Failure to Move to Withdraw Plea. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) provides: [a] motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be 
made only before the sentence is imposed or imposition of the sentence; but to correct 
manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of Gonviction and 
permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea." When a defendant has alleged 
ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the failure of his or her attorney to move to 
withdraw a guilty plea, actual prejudice is shown if the defendant shows a reasonable 
probability that the motion would have been granted. Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 
374, 825 P.2d 94, 97 (Idaho App., 1992). 
As stated in opening brief, in this case, the district court analyzed the facts based 
on two separate views of the testimony; first, that Mr. Watts specifically told his attorney 
to file a motion to withdraw his plea (R., p.167.), and second, that Mr. Watts claimed 
that Mr. Fuller should have known to file a motion to withdraw his plea. (R., p. 170.). 
The court concluded that Mr. Fuller did not perform in a deficient mann~r m either case. 
Mr. Watts contends that the court erred in those findings and conclusions. 
First, Mr. Watt's testimony was that he attempted to phone Mr. Fuller many times 
between the entry of plea and sentencing to discuss withdrawing his plea, but that he 
was unable to do so until just before sentencing. (Tr. 3/22/10, p. 48, L 9 - p.53, L.19.). 
In fact, Mr. Watts testified that when he did communicate to Mr. Fuller that he wanted to 
withdraw his guilty plea, Mr. Fuller told him there was no way he could do it. (Tr. 
3/22/10, p. 70, L.21 - p.71, L. 10.). 
Again, the district court found that Mr. Watts did not directly ask Mr. Fuller to 
withdraw his guilty plea. (R., p. 170.). The sum and substance of the district court's 
conclusion in that regard was that Mr. Watts only stated a desirn, but did not 
«specifically tell" his attorney to do so. (R., p. 168.). 
Mr. Watts re-affirms his contention that the district court erred, and in fact was 
clearly erroneous, by finding that Mr. Watts did not properly ask his attorney to move to 
withdraw his guilty plea. The law does not require an accused lay person to specifically 
direct his attorney to do something when that person has told the attorney he wants the 
attorney to do that very thing. It is Mr. Watt's position that he did all that he needed to 
do to request a motion to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing. In fact, had his 
attorney communicated with him e earlier, he would have made that request prior to 
having received the PSI. Mr. Watt's testimony was clear. 
The state relies on a recorded phone call from Mr. Watts to his attorney. (Exhibit 
4, conversation number 5). Such recording should not be considered in 2ny respect. 
First, it should not have been recorded in the first place. The announcement at the 
beginning of the recorded phone conversation says that attorney/client calls are not 
subject to being recorded, being an exception to all other calls being recorded. Mr. 
Watts should be allowed to rely on that statement. Further, it is not allowed under law. 
Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 808, 9807 P.2d 783 (1995). Further, the recording of Mr. 
Watts' attorney/client calls violates First Amendment rights. 
The right to hire and consult with an attorney is protected by the 1st Amendment 
freedom of speech and association and petition, and the state cannot impede an 
individual's ability to consult with counsel on legal matters. Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 
944, 952, (7th Cir., 2000). Recording a pretrial detainee's calls with his attorney certainly 
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is an impediment to that individual's ability to consult with counsel on legal matters and 
cannot be allowed. Any such recording cannot be considered. 
The recording of Mr. Watts' calls with his attorney violates his Sixth Amendment 
Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel. 
If one has a pending criminal charge, one's attorney/client communications are 
also protected by the further 6th Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S, 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800 (1974). This protection is extended 
to a prisoner's attorney/client phone calls. Martin v. Tyson, 845 F.2d ~451, 1458 (ih 
Cir., 1988). In this case, Mr. Watts' attorney/client calls were being recorded in violation 
of his right to effective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the state cannot rely on such 
recordings. 
No actual injury requirement exists for 1st and 6 th Amendment Violations of a 
Prisoner's Right to Communicate with His Attorney. 
A 1st or 6 th Amendment claim due to the interference with attorney/client 
communications with a pretrial detainee does not require a showing of actual injury. 
Benjamin v. Frasier, 264 F.3d 178, 185-186 (2nd Cir., 2001). This is because pretrial 
detainees require such access to their attorneys so that they can defend charges 
against them, as opposed to pursue claims. Id. 
ln sum, the recording of Mr. Watts' calls with his attorney violates hls rights as a 
pretrial detainee under the 1st and 61h Amendments, and due process, and cannot be 
considered by this court. 
Even if the recordings are to be considered, the recordings support Mr. Watts' 
contentions rather than support the state's position. In the recording (Exhibit 4, 
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conversation 5.), Mr. Watts was very concerned about discussions with Mr. Fuller's staff 
(attorney Dan Brown) that there would be further negotiations, and possibly a 
continuance in order to pursue more negotiations, and that they could change the plea 
agreement. Mr. Fuller was insistent that nothing was going to happen, and that the deal 
was the deal. He called Mr. Watts a desperate man. He then further specifically 
recognized that Mr. Watts and Dan had discussed Mr. Watts' desire to cha11ge his plea, 
and told Mr. Watts flatly that he could not do that. He was dismissive about any 
concerns Mr. Watts had, and said that anything Dan said could not make a difference. 
The call ended with Mr. Fuller committing to talk to Dan about what he and Mr. Watts 
discussed and then he would call Mr. Watts back. That never happened. Mr. Watts 
never relinquished his request to withdraw his plea and try for a better negotiation. Mr. 
Fuller simply recognized the request made to his office, told his client he couldn't do it, 
and when his client had further concerns, dismissed them, saying he would talk to Dan 
and get back to him. Therefore, if the court considers the recording of the call with his 
attorney, the recording proves the point Mr. Watts is contending; that he asked to have 
his plea withdrawn, and that his attorney refused. The other recordings relied upon by 
the state demonstrate some general remorse for what had occurred with his getting 
involved with drugs, but did not constitute any sort of admission of guilt for this alleged 
murder or intent not to pursue his rights. In fact, in Exhibit 4, Conversation 1, Mr. Watts 
details to his aunt how he believed his rights were violated and that he was going to 
pursue appellate and post-conviction relief. Likewise in Exhibit 4, Conversation 2, Mr. 
Watts vehemently maintains his innocence. 
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The district court was clearly erroneous when it found that Mr. Watts did not 
properly ask for a motion to withdraw his plea, and by concluding that his attorney was 
not ineffective in regards to such request. 
Moreover, Mr. Fuller should have moved to withdraw the plea when asked. The 
defendant was very clear in his request prior to sentencing. The district court found that 
when Mr. Fuller told his client there was no way he could moved to withdraw his plea, it 
was simply the attorney's advice that such a motion would be unsuccessful. (R., p. 
169.). 
It is Mr. Watt's position that when his attorney tells a client he cannot do 
something, it means it cannot be done. It is unrealistic to expect a defendant on the day 
before sentencing when he finally gets to consult with his attorney regarding 
withdrawing his plea, and is then told he cannot do it, to expect that person to more 
specifically direct the attorney to do it anyway. The law does not require it. The district 
court erred by so concluding, and in concluding that Mr. Fuller was not ineffective for 
having failed to do so. 
Regarding prejudice, Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) provides: [a] motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea may be made only before the sentence is imposed or imposition of the 
sentence; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the 
judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea." 
The timing of the motion to withdraw a guilty plea affects the exercise of the trial 
court's discretion. State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799. 801, 761 P.2d 1151, 1153 (1998). 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed after sentencing can be granted only to correct a 
"manifest injustice.'' Id. "This strict standard is justified to insure that an ac~used is not 
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encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of the potential punishment and withdraw 
the plea if the sentence is unexpectedly severe." Ward, 135 Idaho at 72, 14 P.3d at 392 
(citing State v. McFarland 130 Idaho 361, 941 P.2d 330, 333 (Ct. App. 2000)). 
However, if a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is filed prior to sentencing, a less 
rigorous standard is applied. Ballard, 114 Idaho at 801, 761 P.2d at 1153. In State v. 
Ward, 135 Idaho 361, 941 P.2d 333 (Ct.App. 2000), the Idaho Court of Appeals stated 
the standard for withdrawing a guilty plea prior to sentencing: 
A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing must 
show a "just reason" for withdrawing the guilty plea. The "just reason" 
standard does not require that a defendant establish a constitutional 
defect in his or her guilty plea. Once the defendant has met his burden, 
the state may avoid a withdrawal of the plea by demonstrating the 
existence of prejudice to the state .... [T]he district court is encouraged 
to liberally exercise its discretion in granting a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea. 
Ward, 135 Idaho at 72, 14 P.3d at 392 (internal citations omitted). 
Mr. Watts testified that he told his attorney he wanted to withdraw his plea, and 
pursue trial and/or further negotiations. A judge would have been bound by the 
mandate to liberally exercise discretion in considering the motion. 
Because Mr. Fuller did not move to withdraw Mr. Watt's guilty plea when plainly 
asked to do so, his representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in 
that regard. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Suits v. 
State, 143 Idaho 160, 162, 139 P.3d 762, 764 (Ct. App. 2006). 
Further, because Mr. Watts had wanted to withdraw his guilty plea from the day 
after he entered it, and because he had only to show just reason, he demonstrated a 
reasonable probability such a motion would have been granted. As the court is 
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encouraged to exercise discretion in such motions, and this case was a murder case, a 
reasonable probability existed that a timely filed motion would have been granted. 
In sum, it is Mr. Watt's position that the culmination of the above factors 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, in regards to his entry of a guilty plea and 
that therefore his plea was not voluntarily entered but was rather entered under duress 
and coercion. Further, Mr. Watts contends that his attorney fell below the objective 
standard of reasonable performance by failing to pursue a motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea when asked to do so, and that such failure deprived him of the opportunity for such 
motion to be heard under the standards for hearing such motions prior to sentencing 
and even before review of the PSI. 
Therefore, Mr. Watts re-affirms his contention that the district court erred by 
denying Mr. Watt's petition for post-conviction relief based on the evidence before the 
court. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, Mr. Watts respectfully requests that this Court vacate the 
district court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this i2_ day of Augu_st, 2011. 
ST PHEN D. THOMPSON 
Conflict Appellate Public Defender 
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